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Teams in Japan’s two professional baseball leagues began to add foreign players to their 
rosters in the early 1950s, with the average number of foreign players per team reaching 
5.79 in 2004.  One reason for their increased use of foreign players was that foreign hitters 
substantially outperformed Japanese hitters.  We show that the pace of team integration 
with African-American, Latino, and Caucasian players varied substantially across teams, a 
pattern also observed in North American professional baseball leagues.  Using team data 
for the 1958-2004 seasons, econometric analysis shows that good teams that experienced a 
poor season played foreign players more frequently in the next season’s games.  
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I.  Introduction 
From the 1940s through the 1970s, professional baseball teams in North America 
integrated with minority players, and professional baseball teams in Japan integrated with 
foreign players.  In North America, this initially meant adding Latino players (from 1933)
2, 
African-American players (from 1947) and Asian players (from 1995)
3 to team rosters.  In 
Japan, this initially meant signing Japanese-                                        
subsequently Caucasian, African-American, and Latino players from North and South 
             finally players from other Asian countries. Economists, social scientists, and 
popular writers have intensively studied the history of racial and ethnic integration by 
Major League Baseball (MLB) teams whereas they have generally ignored the parallel 
history of racial integration by Nippon Professional Baseball (NPB) teams. A notable 
exception is Robert Fitts’s book, Remembering Japanese Baseball.
4  The lack of attention 
paid to integration of NPB teams with foreign players is unfortunate, as NPB integration 
was, like many aspects of Japanese professional baseball, both very similar to and very 
different from MLB integration.  
 The integration of Caucasian, Latino, and African-American players from North and 
South American countries into the professional sports teams of an ethnically homogeneous 
country that, just a few years earlier, had been defeated and occupied by American military 
                                                       
2 Fifty-five mostly light skin tone Latinos from the Spanish-speaking Americas played for MLB 
teams prior to 1947  (Burgos, 2007, ch. 9).  See Burgos (2007) for a history of the integration of 
Latino players in Major League Baseball. 
 
3 Masanori Murakami was the first Japan-born Japanese player in MLB, pitching successfully for 
the San Francisco Giants during the 1964/1965 seasons.   Thirty years elapsed before an MLB team 
would sign a second player from Japan, pitcher Hideo Nomo.   
 
4 The addition of a veteran U.S. baseball player to an NPB team was the subject of a popular 1992 
movie, Mr. Baseball, featuring Tom Selleck as the U.S. baseball player. 
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forces, is an interesting story in its own right.  An empirical study of racial integration in 
Japanese baseball also allows us to place studies of Northern American baseball in 
comparative perspective, as professional baseball leagues on both sides of the Pacific 
Ocean share a common institution:  The Rules of Play of the Game of Baseball.  It’s three 
strikes and you are out wherever baseball is played.  The MLB and NPB rules of play have 
been almost identical in every post-WWII season, with rule changes initiated by MLB 
quickly adopted by NPB.
5  The common institution of the “Game of Baseball” provides the 
ideal setting for comparative analysis, as it allows researchers to identify how differences 
in markets for players, competition among league teams, league rules, and cultures affected 
choices of NPB and MLB teams and players.  
There are several substantial differences in the economic and social environments in 
Japan and the United States that could have affected both the timing of a team’s initial 
integration of foreign players and the team’s decisions to play them in games in subsequent 
seasons.  First, Japan did not have the same history of racial animus against African-
Americans or Latinos as the United States.  Second, African-American and Latino players 
on MLB teams were usually paid less than Caucasian players, whereas foreign players on 
NPB teams were paid more than Japanese players.  Third, in Japan, NPB rules limited the 
number of foreign players per team, whereas MLB rules did not explicitly constrain the 
number of African-American or Latino players per team after Jackie Robinson’s debut with 
the Brooklyn Dodgers in 1947.  Finally, NPB teams are typically owned by large Japanese 
                                                       
5 Consider, for example, the parallel resolution in Japan and North America of the early 1970s 
controversies regarding the designated hitter rule (which allows a designated player to bat for the 
pitcher):  The American League adopted the rule, while the National League balked.  Two years 
later, the same debate went on in the NPB, and the same split-decision was adopted: The Pacific 
League adopted the rule and the Central League politely declined. 
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corporations, while MLB teams are typically owned by wealthy individuals and families.
6  
We discuss these differences and others more fully below.  
We begin our analysis with a discussion of the data sets that we use in our empirical 
analysis.  We follow with a short history of NPB team integration and briefly compare 
experiences of NPB and MLB teams.  Our empirical analysis focuses on four main 
questions:  (1) When did NPB teams initially integrate with players from North and South 
America and what factors affected team decisions? (2) How did teams’ use of foreign 
players and use of players from specific racial and ethnic groups change over time? (3) 
How well did foreign players perform compared to Japanese players, and how did their 
presence on NPB team rosters affect team performances? And (4), what factors are 
associated with changes in team decisions to play foreign players in games over time?7  We 
conclude with a discussion comparing the different yet similar paths of integration taken by 
MLB and NPB teams. 
 
II. Data for NPB Teams, Japanese Players, and Foreign Players  
  Economists have extensively analyzed player and team performance in North 
American MLB because of the close correspondence between a hitter’s marginal team 
product and his measured hitting performance as well as the availability of comprehensive 
data on player and team characteristics and performances over 136 seasons. There has been 
much less scholarly attention paid to Japanese professional baseball, and this may be partly 
                                                       
6 A few exceptions:  The Seattle Mariners are owned by the American subsidiary of a Japanese 
corporation, Nintendo.  Three other MLB teams—Toronto Blue Jays (Rogers Communications), 
Chicago Cubs (Tribune Corp.) and Atlanta Braves (Liberty Media)—are owned by corporations. 
 
7 We identify foreign players as those players defined as foreign by NPB.  
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due to shorter time series for the two Japan professional baseball leagues (which are 
generally available only from 1958) and the lack of a comprehensive database with 
relevant data on player and team characteristics and performances.  Our analysis of NPB 
team integration uses data on players and teams for the 1958-2004 baseball seasons 
collected from multiple sources  (listed separately in the Appendix) that enable us to cross-
check and resolve data discrepancies, particularly with respect to player race, ethnicity, and 
national status.  We follow the NPB’s rule for designating a player as a foreigner:  Was the 
player born outside of Japan?  We then classify foreign players into four different ethnic 
and racial categories:  African-American, Latino, Caucasian, and Others, with Others being 
a residual category consisting almost entirely of players with Asian ancestries who were 
not born in Japan.
8  We classify a player as Latino if they were born in the Caribbean, 
Central America, or South America.  We classify a player who was born in the United 
States or Canada as African-American on the basis of available biographical information on 
the player and, when necessary, by examining publicly available pictures of the player.
9  
                                                       
8 Classification of players into racial and ethnic categories is inherently problematic for numerous 
reasons:  Race and ethnicity are both dubious scienti                                                   
                                                                                                    
used by fans, owners, or teammates to make racial or ethnic classifications can vary with the 
identity of the person making the classification. 
 
9 Our rules for classifying players into racial and ethnic groups differ across racial and ethnic 
groups:  we classify players as Latino based on their place of birth and as African-American based 
on their ancestry and, in limited cases, on the authors’ evaluations of a player’s skin color.  This 
classification has been used by most studies of racial and ethnic discrimination in MLB because it 
is capable of implementation.  If, however, Japanese baseball fans and the player’s teammates are 
categorizing players as African-American or Latinos using different criteria, for example by 
darkness of skin tone, then our categorization of players will be problematic for Latinos with darker 
skin tones who might be classified as African-American and for lighter skin tone African-
Americans who might be classified as a separate “more acceptable” group.  See Goldsmith et al. 
(2006) for an econometric study of the effect of skin tone on wages of African workers in U.S. 
labor markets.   5
See the Appendix for a list of sources providing player biographical information and 
pictures. 
Classification of players into national and ethnic categories yields counts of players 
in each category that are useful for analyzing some research questions, e.g., team decisions 
to add their first foreign or minority player and changes in the composition of minority 
players on a team’s roster. Studies of the integration of MLB teams with Latino and 
African-American players have used count data in econometric analyses of such questions.  
However, other research questions, e.g., the impact of foreign players on team performance 
or subsequent decisions by teams to hire and to play foreign players, could be analyzed 
more precisely with a measure that combines both the presence of a foreign players on a 
team’s roster and his use by the team at the plate and on the mound. We develop a new 
measure of a team’s use of foreign players in its games that fortuitously allows aggregation 
of foreign hitters and foreign pitchers.  We define a team’s offensive and defensive plays 
for a season as the sum of (1) the number of plate appearances by the team’s batters 
(offensive plays) and (2) the number of opposing teams’ plate appearances against the 
team’s pitchers (defensive plays).  We then calculate the proportion of offensive and 
defensive plays [ODPlaysit] made by foreign, non-Japanese, Latino, African-American, and 
Caucasian players on each team for the 1958-2004 seasons and name the corresponding 
variables NonJpn-ODPlaysit, Latino-ODPlaysit, and so forth.  
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the six panel data samples used in our  
              [Table 1] 
econometric studies.  Each of the six panels is complete and balanced, with twelve cross-  6
section units.   We provide additional discussion of other variables used in our econometric 
analysis in the sections discussing these models and estimation results.   
 
III.  Integration in the Nippon Professional Baseball Leagues 
While the rosters of NPB teams were predominately filled by Japanese players from 
the beginning of professional baseball in Japan in 1936 through the 1940s, foreign players 
were an accepted part of Japanese professional baseball in the 1930s.
10  Fitts (2009, p. 80) 
reports that “[p]rior to World War II, sixteen Nisei [Japanese-American players born in 
Hawaii], two Caucasians and an African-American [Jimmy Bonna] had joined the league.”  
The first foreign players to play for a professional baseball team in Japan were Harris 
McGaillard (also known as “Bucky Harris”), a U.S. catcher who played for Nagoya in 
1936, Yoshi Takahashi, a second-generation Japanese-American from Hawaii, and Herb 
North, another Nisei from Hawaii. Victor Starffin, a Russian pitcher, joined the Tokyo 
Giants in 1936 and became the first pitcher in Japanese professional baseball to win 300 
games.  Other foreign players also impressed, including the Hawaii-born Nisei and 
Baseball Hall of Fame player, Bozo Wakabayashi.   
The expansion of hostilities between Japan and its neighbors in the late 1930s and 
early 1940s brought this era to an end, as most, but not all, foreign players left Japan. 
Amazingly, NPB play continued through the war years, with games only suspended from 
June 1945.
11  When play resumed in 1946, some Hawaii-born Japanese Americans with 
                                                       
10 Material for this section draws from Fitts (2005 and 2009).  We also used data from a website 
providing lists of foreign players on team rosters in the 1950s and 1960s: 
http://noboruaota.blogspot.com/2010_01_01_archive.html (last access on 31 August 2011). 
 
11 Personal communication with Robert Fitts. 
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joint U.S.-Japan citizenship played for NPB teams, but other foreign players from the 
coalition of countries that defeated Japan were not to be found on NPB rosters.  
The second influx of foreign players clearly starts in the 1951 season when Wally 
Yonamine, a Hawaii-born Japanese American without dual citizenship, began his Japan 
Hall-of-Fame career as an outfielder with the Tokyo Giants.
12  Eleven other players from 
Hawaii and the mainland United States came to play in Japan in 1952, including the first 
two Caucasian players to play in Japan since the war, Marion O’Neil and Billy Wyatt for 
the Lions,
13 and the first two African-American players to play on an NPB team, pitcher 
Jimmy Newbury and infielder John Brittian for the Braves. The Braves hired four other 
African-American players over the next four years, including pitcher Rufus Gaines and 
infielder Larry Raines. 
The Braves (now the BlueWaves) were pioneering in their use of African-American 
players during the 1950s, but other NPB teams were much slower to add African-American 
players, perhaps in part because the Braves finished as high as second place only once 
during the 1950s.  It would take until 1962 for a second team, the Dragons, to add African-
American players to its roster, and until 1966 for a third to act (Table 2).  The process of  
[Table 2 here] 
integration was considerably dragged out, with the Tokyo Giants adding their first African-
American player only in 1980.
14  Figure 1 reveals three distinct periods over which  
                                                       
12 Three other Japanese-Americans (Jyo Furutani, Isao Odate, and Isamu Uchio) were on NPB team 
rosters in Japan prior to Yonamine but either had very short stints or were back-up players who 
rarely played in games.   
 
13 Wyatt and O’Neil both served in the U.S. military in Japan prior to playing on NPB teams. 
 
14 One reason for the extended integration of African-American players into NPB teams may have 
been the small number of African-American players on rosters of North American minor league   8
[Figure 1 here] 
the average number of African-Americans per team increased over time:  Between zero and 
one player per team                                                                 
                                                       
The pace of integration of teams with Caucasian players was remarkably different 
in each league.  While five Pacific League teams had 15 Caucasian players on their rosters 
during various seasons in the 1950s, there were no Caucasian players on Central League 
teams until the Tigers added Mike Solomko to their roster for the 1960 season.  It would be 
another 15 seasons before the last Central League holdout, the Tokyo Giants signed its first 
Caucasian player.   
Latino integration proceeded much more slowly than African-American and 
Caucasian integration.  The first team to add a Latino player to its roster in the post-war era 
was the pioneering Braves who signed the Cuban infielder Roberto “Chico” Barbon in 
1955 (Table 2).  Seven more NPB teams added Latino players to their rosters by the 1972 
season, but the four remaining teams moved at a very slow pace.    It would take another 14 
years (1986) for the Giants, an additional 9 and 10 years (1995 and 1996) for the Fighters 
and the Hawks, respectively, and another 3 years (1999) for the Dragons to add a Latino 
player to their rosters. 
What explains the differences between the faster integration pace observed for 
African-American and Caucasian players relative to Latino players?  One factor may be 
that the African-American and Caucasians hitters provided slugging performances that 
were, with all due respects to the great Sadaharu Oh and other big-time Japanese sluggers, 
far better than those provided by most competing Japanese players.  By contrast, Latino 
                                                                                                                                                                 
teams during the late 1950s and early 1960s.   9
players, often known for their specialization in defensive skills and contact hitting, may not 
have been significantly better than many of their Japanese competitors.  A significant skill 
advantage would have been important, as teams were free to compete for foreign players. 
In addition, some players from North and South America would have had higher 
reservation wages due to opportunities in North American professional baseball.  
 
IV.  Performance of Foreign Players and their Teams in Post-War Japan, 1951-1962   
Did foreign hitters hired by NPB teams perform better than Japanese hitters?
15  
Figure 2 compares the end-of-season slugging average for all Japanese players and all 
foreign players on NPB team rosters during the 1958-2004 seasons.
16  Over the 1958-1961 
[Figure 2 here] 
seasons, the slugging averages of the two groups were similar, but a large gap favoring 
foreign players opened in 1962, as teams experimented with signing power hitters already 
seasoned with MLB experience. Over the 1963-1982 seasons, the slugging average of 
foreign players (.455) exceeded the slugging average of Japanese players (.374), an 
astounding gap of 19.6 percent.  The gap narrowed during the 1981-1983 seasons, but 
emerged at an even higher level—24 percent—during the 1984-2004 seasons.
17 
                                                       
15 Gwartney and Haworth (1974, Table 3, p. 878) found that the average annual slugging average of 
African-American players added to MLB team rosters exceeded those of “all players” by .095 in 
1950 and .055 in 1955.   
 
16 A player’s slugging average is defined as number of hits weighted by number of bases divided by 
player’s at-bats: 
 
SA = [(4 x homeruns) + (3 x triples) + (2 x doubles) + (singles)]/player at-bats. 
17 Slugging averages increased for both foreign players (.584) and Japanese players (.457) over the 
1983-2004 seasons. 
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  Did NPB teams with more foreign players on their rosters perform better than teams 
with fewer foreign players during the early seasons of NPB integration, 1951-1962?  In 
their classic study of the integration of MLB teams with African-American players, 
Gwartney and Haworth (1974, Table 2) found that MLB teams that added more African-
American players to their rosters in the early seasons of MLB integration, 1950-1959, 
achieved more wins.  We investigate Gwartney and Haworth’s question for the early 
seasons of integration for NPB teams, 1951-1962, and examine two different measures of 
team performance each season:  the percentage of games in regular season t won by team i 
(WinPercentit) and whether team i won the pennant in its league during season t (Penanntit 
=1 if team won pennant, 0 otherwise).   We estimate separate regressions for the Pacific 
and Central Leagues, as there was no interleague play during our sample period and foreign 
players on a team in the Central League could not have influenced the performance of 
teams in the Pacific League.  Running separate regressions for each league also allows for 
the estimated effect of a foreign player on his team performance to differ across leagues.
18   
  Consider a parsimonious regression specification, in this instance using WinPercentit 
as the measure of team performance: 
(1)    WinPercentit = β0 +β1WinPercentit−1 +β2PropForeignit +εit,  
 
where WinPercentit-1, the percentage of games won by team i in the previous season, is 
included to control for domestic talent on team i      PropForeignit is the proportion of the 
league’s foreign players (including Japanese-Americans) on the roster of team i in season 
                                                       
18 We could have estimated a single regression equation using samples from both leagues by 
including an interaction variable of Leaguei with Foreignit.  Proper interpretation of estimated 
coefficients and standard errors for an interaction variable in a non-linear panel regression is, 
however, fraught with difficulties.  We avoid this problem by estimating separate regressions for 
each league, albeit at the cost of smaller sample sizes for each of the league regressions.   11
t.
19  We use scale our count of a team’s foreign players by the overall number of foreign 
players on all team rosters to obtain a measure of competitive advantage realized by the 
team from adding a foreign player.  If only one team adds a high-performing foreign player, 
it gains a competitive advantage over other teams and PropForeignit for team i increases.  
If, however, each league team adds a high-performing foreign player to its roster, then no 
team gains a competitive advantage and PropForeignit does not change. 
  We first estimate WinPercent regressions for each league using pooled OLS with 
team dummy variables.  Regressions results for each league are reported in Table 3, column  
[Table 3 here] 
1.  In the Central League regression, the estimated coefficient on WinPercentit-1, is positive 
and statistically significant at the 5 percent level, indicating substantial persistence in team 
talent and performance across seasons (Table 3, Panel B, column 1).  The estimated 
coefficient on PropForeignit is positive and statistically significant at the five percent.  By 
contrast, in the pooled OLS regression for the Pacific League, the estimated coefficient on 
WinPercentit-1 is positive but not statistically significant at the ten percent level (Table 3, 
Panel A column 1).   The estimated coefficient on PropForeignit is positive but not 
statistically significant at the ten percent level.  Addition of season dummies to pooled OLS 
regressions fails to appreciably change regression results in either league. 
Because unobserved time-invariant factors specific to each team could be biasing the 
pooled OLS estimates, we experiment with random effects and fixed effects panel 
estimators.  As results using both panel specifications are broadly similar, we focus on 
                                                       
19 In this analysis, we count the number of foreign players by classifying a player as foreign if he 
was born outside of Japan. This differs somewhat from the NPB count of foreign players, as the 
NPB’s cap on the number of foreign players on a team’s roster exempted foreign players who 
joined Japanese baseball prior to 1952, e.g., Wally Yonamine.   12
results from the random effects regressions (Table 3, column 2).  For the Central League, 
the estimated coefficient on WinPercentit more than doubles, increasing from .29 in the 
pooled OLS regression to .64 in the random effects regression, and is estimated with much 
more precision.  The estimated coefficient on PropForeignit is once again positive (albeit 
falling from .12 to .09) and remains statistically significant at the five percent level.  For 
the Pacific League random effects regression, there is a substantial change in the estimated 
coefficient on WinPercentit:  its magnitude increases substantially, rising from .16 to .66, 
and it is estimated with more precision, becoming statistically significant at the five percent 
level.  However, the estimated coefficient for PropForeignit is now negative and remains 
statistically insignificant at the ten percent level.  
  Now consider the same regression specification with Pennantit substituted for 
WinPercentit as the measure of team performance: 
 (2)    Pennantit = β0 +β1WinPercentit−1 +β2PropForeign+αt +εit 
We estimate regressions for both leagues using pooled logit.  Results are reported in Table  
3, column 3.  A comparison of estimated coefficients on PropForeignit in the Pacific and 
Central League regressions shows that while both are statistically significant at the five 
percent level, the Central League estimate is positive (5.99) while the Pacific League 
estimate is negative (-9.27).   
The results from the Pennant regressions reinforce those from the WinPercent 
regressions: an additional foreign player on one Central League team is associated with 
better team performance, while an additional foreign player on a Pacific League team is 
associated with either no change or a decline in team performance.  How do the regression 
results correspond to the actual competition between league teams during the initial years   13
of team integration?  The lack of impact—or even negative impact—of foreign players on 
team performance in the Pacific League stems in part from the poor performance of the 
Braves, who had the most foreign players on their roster in the early and mid-1950s.  With 
the Braves failure to win a pennant or a large percentage of their games, other Pacific 
League teams responded by reducing the number of foreign players on their rosters.  The 
number of foreign players in the Pacific League declined from 10 in 1952 and 15 in 1953 
to 6 in 1954 and to just 5 from 1955 to 1958. And on the winning side of the ledger, the 
Lions and the Braves, two teams that won ten Pacific League pennants over the 1951-1962 
seasons, had no foreign players on their rosters during their glory years.  By contrast, the 
positive impact of a foreign player on team performance in the Central League can be 
traced to the astounding success of the Tokyo Giants.  The Giants won 9 of 12 Central 
League pennants over the 1951-1962 seasons and used more foreign players—primarily 
Japanese-Americans born in Hawaii—than any other Central League team over this period. 
The increase in the number of foreign players on NPB teams in 1951 and 1952 led 
both leagues to impose a rule during the 1952 season that restricted each team’s game-day 
roster to include no more than three foreign players selected from its full player roster 
(Table 4).  In 1955, the two leagues imposed another rule limiting the number of foreign 
players on a team’s full roster, i.e., a combined roster of players assigned to either the 
major league team or affiliated minor league teams.
20  Initially limiting each team to three 
foreign players on its full roster, the NPB reduced the cap to two foreign players 
[Table 4 here]  
                                                       
20 Fitts (2009, p. 189) argues that the NPB Commissioner’s Office established the three-player 
roster cap for foreign players in May 1955 when the Giants had six foreign players on their team 
and were dominating Central League play.  
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in 1966 and raised it to three in 1981.
21  In 1996, the NPB eliminated restrictions on the 
number of foreign players on a team’s full roster.   
There have also been substantial changes in the rules regulating the number of 
foreign players from a team’s full roster who can be registered by the team for a particular 
game.  For the 1952-1965 seasons, a team was allowed to register three foreign players for 
a game.  The NPB reduced the registration cap to two players in 1966, and this ceiling 
survived until 1994 when the NPB increased it to three players.  Since 1998, teams have 
been allowed to register four foreign players for a game.  Changes in NPB rules over 
time—which are somewhat more detailed than described above—are summarized in Table 
4.   
  Was the cap on the number of foreign players on a team’s full roster binding?  Figure 
3 presents data on the number of foreign players on the full team roster of the teams with 
the smallest and largest number of foreign players and the average number of foreign  
[Figure 3] 
players on the full team rosters of all NPB teams over the 1958 to 2004 seasons.  Inspection 
of the maximum number of players on an NPB team shows that the roster cap was binding 
for at least one team in every season from 1958 to 2004, as the largest number of players 
on a team equaled or exceeded the roster cap.
22  Inspection of the smallest number of 
foreign players on an NPB team shows that the roster cap was not binding for at least one 
NPB team during the 1958-1975 and 1981-1995 seasons, as the smallest number of foreign 
                                                       
21 Although teams were permitted to have three foreign players on their full rosters from the 1981 
season, they were allowed to register only two foreign players for each game until the 1993 season. 
 
22 Our measure of the number of foreign players on a team full roster sometimes exceeds the 
foreign player roster cap, as we do not differentiate between foreign players who are on a team’s 
full roster for a fraction of a season and those on the full team roster for the full season.  
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players on an NPB team was less than the roster cap. However, the roster cap was binding 
for all teams during the 1976-1980 seasons, as the smallest number of foreign players on a 
team equaled to the roster cap.   
Inspection of the average number of foreign players on all team rosters yields another 
measure of how much team roster caps constrained team choices:  whether the average 
number of foreign players on all team rosters exceeded the roster cap.  This occurred in the 
1975-1980 seasons (already identified above) and the 1990, 1992, 1994, and 1995 
seasons.
23  At the end of each episode, the NPB adjusted its roster cap, increasing it to three 
foreign players in 1981 and eliminating it in 1996.  Teams responded to the cap’s 
elimination by doubling the average number of foreign players over the next five seasons, 
from 3.17 players in 1995 to 6.25 in 2000.  We note that the change to an unlimited number 
of foreign players on team rosters came just a season after Hideo Nomo, one of the NPB’s 
superstar pitchers, left Japan to play for an MLB team, the Los Angeles Dodgers.  The 
change in the roster cap allowed NPB teams to offset the loss of some of their best players 
to MLB teams over the next decade with an inflow of new talent from outside Japan. 
 
V.  Econometric Analysis of MLB Integration and Extensions to NPB Integration 
Our analysis of NPB’s integration with foreign players builds on the literature 
analyzing MLB’s integration with African-Americans and Latino players after 1946.  We 
briefly review the economics literature on MLB integration and then identify some broad 
similarities and differences between the two integration episodes. 
                                                       
23During the 1990s seasons, at least one NPB team used fewer players than allowed by the league 
roster cap.    16
 Gwartney and Haworth (1974) found that teams in North American baseball that 
were the first to add African-American players performed better than other teams.  They 
concluded that the superior team performance of first-adopters was primarily due to the 
superior performance of the first African-American players.  Contrary to Gary Becker’s 
assertion that market competition would tend to gradually erode discrimination, Gwartney 
and Haworth found little evidence that under-performing baseball teams that were slow to 
add their first African-American player subsequently integrated more fully.  Hanssen’s 
(1998) re-examination of these issues concluded that the slow pace of integration by many 
American League teams could be attributed to persistent discriminatory preferences of fans 
in American League cities.  By contrast, Lanning (2010) attributes the slow pace of 
integration to discriminatory preferences of teammates and team owners. 
Goff, McCormick, and Tollison (2002) changed the discussion from discrimination 
by owners, players, and fans to how differences in team characteristics could affect their 
integration decisions.  They posited that team integration is most profitably viewed as a 
risky innovation that would be pursued either by winning teams with excellent, forward-
looking management or by losing teams with management desperate to identify and 
implement organizational and technological innovations capable of generating more team 
wins.  Their regression results show that MLB teams with better win-loss records were 
more likely to hire African-American players than teams with worse win-loss records.  
Hanssen and Meehan (2009) used new econometric specifications that incorporated past 
contributions of African-American players to a team’s performance into management’s 
decision to adjust the number of African-American players on the roster, a factor neglected 
by Goff et al.  In general, Hanssen and Meehan’s regression results do not support a   17
statistically significant association between team performance and counts of African-
American players on team rosters. 
Coyne, Isaacs, and Schwartz (2010) criticize econometric methodologies employed 
by Goff et al. (2002) and Hanssen and Meehan (2009) for failing to account for the large 
share of observations equal to zero in their dependent variables and to use regression 
techniques more suitable for “count data” dependent variables, such as zero-inflated panel 
estimators.  From their panel regressions of MLB teams for the 1947-1956 seasons—the 
period during which most MLB teams integrated, they conclude that a team’s use of 
African-American players increases the likelihood that the team will contend for a pennant 
and, vice versa, that teams in contention are more likely to add African-American players 
to their rosters.   
Finally, Coyne, Isaacs, Schwartz, and Carilli (2007) argue that team integration is 
likely to depend not just on the competitive performance of individual teams but also on 
the competitive balance within the team’s league.  In other words, a team that is just a few 
wins behind the league’s best team, is more likely to add minority players than a team with 
the win-loss record and player talent that is far behind the league’s best team. 
There are some obvious similarities and differences between the MLB and NPB 
integration episodes.  Consider these similarities. Both MLB and NPB team owners took 
risks when they decided to integrate, as they were unsure how the new players would 
perform, how Caucasian fans would respond to African-American players, and how 
Japanese fans would respond to foreign players so soon after World War II.  In both Japan 
and North America, it quickly became clear that the average foreign player (in Japan) or 
minority player (in North America) performed better than the average Caucasian player on   18
an MLB team or the average Japanese player on an NPB team.  And with superior 
performances from a new group of players, a team might plausibly expect to win more 
games if it integrated before other teams in its league (Gwartney and Haworth, 1974).    
Now consider these differences.   In MLB, teams integrated with African-American 
players who faced discrimination from both fans and teammates, while in NPB, teams 
integrated first primarily with Japanese-American players from Hawaii and California.    In 
Japan, many players from North and South America found it difficult to adapt to a complex 
extremely different cultural environment, social isolation, language barriers, daunting 
training sessions, and the very different strategies employed in the Japanese game.
24 
Perhaps the most striking difference is that for MLB teams, African-American players 
could be hired through the 1970s at a discount to Caucasian players, whereas for NPB 
teams, foreign players were paid a premium compared to Japanese players.
25 
Despite these differences, the same questions posed for MLB integration are central 
for NPB integration:  Which factors affected team decisions to add their first foreign 
player?  Which factors affected team decisions to play more foreign players in games in the 
seasons following the initial period of integration?  We address both questions below. 
 
VI.  Discrete-Time Hazard Analysis of First Foreign Players on NPB Team Rosters 
Our  econometric  analysis  of  NPB  teams’  choices  to  add  their  first  Caucasian, 
African-American or Latino player to their rosters uses a piecewise-constant proportional 
                                                       
24 See Whiting (1989),                                                                                 
in Japan. 
 
25 Possible sources of higher salaries paid to foreign include the absence of a NPB draft assigning 
rights to a foreign player to a specific team and the higher reservation wages of U.S. players, 
particularly during the 1950s and 1960s when Japan’s economy was rebuilding. 
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hazard model commonly used to analyze grouped duration data (Wooldridge, 2010, 1010-
1017). In this model the hazard rate at time t, hit, varies across each time interval (but not 
within the interval) and has a single time-invariant covariate and a single time-varying 
covariate:  
(3)   
where  t is a time dummy variable, Leaguei is a time-invariant dummy variable indicating 
the  team’s  league  (Pacific  League=1  and  Central  League=0),  and  WinPercentit-1  is  the 
percentage of games won by team i in season t-1.
26  Transforming to the logit specifications 
yields:  






 αt +β1Leaguei +β2WinPercentit−1 +εit  
We have used a parsimonious specification of covariates, just two variables, due to limited 
degrees of freedom.  We include Leaguei in the hazard regression specification because 
previous  research  on  MLB  and  NPB  has  found  distinct  differences  in  the  competitive 
environment  within  each  of  the  two  MLB  leagues  and  NPB  leagues.  Coyne,  Issacs, 
Schwartz, and Carilli (2007) found that teams in the National League were more likely to 
add an African-American player to their roster because of the relative competitive balance 
in the National League vis-à-vis the American League during the 1946-1960 period. La 
Croix and Kawaura (1999) found that the Pacific League had greater competitive balance 
than the Central League over the 1958-1974 period.
27  
                                                       
26 No NPB team has ever switched leagues. 
 
27 The difference in competitive balance across the two professional baseball leagues in North 
America and the two leagues Japan is mostly due to the dominance of one team in one league in 
each country:  the New York Yankees in the American League and the Tokyo Giants in the Central 
League.  
hit = 1+exp(−(αt + β1Leagueii + β2WinPercentit−1))    
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Following Goff, McCormick and Tollison (2002) and Hanssen and Meehan (2009), 
we include a measure of the team’s success in the previous season to determine the source 
of innovation in roster composition.  As discussed above, adding the first foreign player 
from  a  particular  ethnic/racial  group  to  a  baseball  team  composed  almost  entirely  of 
Japanese players is a risky and expensive action that could trigger changes in attendance at 
team games, coordination of player actions on and off the field, and team performance.   
Our three basic specifications for the logit regression are: 
  
(5)    First_Ethnicit = β1WinPercentit-1 + β2Leaguei + αt + εit, 
 
where First_Ethnic equals one in the season t in which team i hires its first player of a 
particular ethnicity and 0 in earlier seasons.  We use variants of this variable for three 
ethnicities: First_Caucasion, First_African-American, and First_Latino.  αt is a vector of 
baseball season dummy variables employed to estimate duration-dependent baseline hazard 
rates, and εit is an iid error term.  
  Results from logit regressions for each ethnic group are reported in Table 5.  The  
[Table 5 here] 
results are broadly consistent across ethnic groups. The estimated coefficients on Leaguei 
are positive in each regression but are not statistically significant at the ten percent level in 
any of the three regressions. Its magnitude is largest in the First_Caucasian regression, 
perhaps in part because five of the first six Caucasian players joined Pacific League teams 
(Table 2). The estimated coefficient on WinPercentit-1 is negative in all three regressions.  It 
is statistically significant at the five percent level in both the First_African-American and 
First_Caucasian regressions and just misses being statistically significant at the ten percent 
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level in the First_Latino regression (p=.14).  Taken together, the three regressions provide 
support for the hypothesis that struggling NPB teams were more likely to experiment with 
adding their first players from particular racial/ethnic groups than successful NPB teams.  
 
VII.  Use of Foreign Players by Japanese Teams Over 37 Seasons: 1958-2004  
Our analysis of NPB team use of foreign players departs significantly from earlier 
analyses of MLB team use of African-American and Latino players.  Rather than analyze 
counts of the number of foreign players on NPB team rosters, we instead analyze a 
composite measure of the share of offensive and defensives plays by a team’s foreign 
players, Foreign_OD-Playsit.  (See section II for a full discussion of this variable.)  The 
new composite measure is more informative for our purposes because it measures how 
often a particular group of players actually played and, therefore, how often they were seen 
by their team’s and opposing teams’ fans.  From a human capital perspective, 
Foreign_ODPlaysit provides a direct adjustment for the team’s utilization of the player in 
games and an indirect adjustment for the player’s quality because a team is only allowed to 
have 9 players from its 25-player game roster in action on any given play.
28  Use of our 
composite measure also enables us to bypass econometric problems associated with 
estimating regressions with a dependent variable that takes the form of count data. 
Our econometric model is a variation on the basic model specified by Hanssen and 
Meehan (2009) to investigate how prior performance of an NPB team affects the team’s 
willingness to add minority players to its roster: 
                                                       
28 A player who leaves a baseball game and is replaced by another player cannot return later to the 
game, as in soccer and unlike in basketball or American football. 
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(6)   
The estimated coefficients on the one- and two-period lags of WinPercentit are the main 
focus of this regression, as they are the only team characteristics specified in our regression 
model.  We note that WinPercentit is measured without error and is pre-determined (albeit 
not strictly exogenous) to the dependent variable due to being lagged one period.  
Incomeit—real GDP per capita of the prefecture in which the team’s stadium is located,
29 
TeamCap3t, and TeamCap4t are control variables.
30  Incomeit is included as a control 
because lower-income individuals are more frequently associated with xenophobic or 
racially-biased attitudes than higher-income individuals.
31  We include two dummy 
variables for the years in which the team player registration cap was three foreign players 
(TeamCap3t=1 for the 1958-1965 and 1994-1997 seasons) and four foreign players 
(TeamCap4t=1 for the 1998-2004 seasons). Estimated coefficients for the two registration 
cap dummies should provide indications of whether NPB ceilings on player registration for 
each game were binding.
32 
Our model differs from Hanssen’s and Meehan’s model in two ways.  First, we use 
our composite measure of a team’s utilization of non-Japanese foreign players—Non-
Jpn_ODPlaysit—as the dependent variable, primarily because this enables us to incorporate 
                                                       
29 Prefecture income data are from Department of National Accounts, Economic and Social 
Research Institute, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. 
 
30 All regressions with season dummy variables are estimated without a constant to allow inclusion 
of all season dummies. 
 
31 In their MLB study, Goff et al. also include the percentage of the population of a team’s 
metropolitan area that is nonwhite.  In Japan, this percentage is extremely small and is unlikely to 
be associated with variation in the number of foreign players.  Thus, we do not include this variable 
in our regressions.   
 
32 As always, they could be picking up other phenomena affecting NPB teams during these periods.  
Ethnic_ODPlaysit = β0Ethnic_ODPlaysit−1 + β1WinPercentit−1 + β2WinPercentit−2
+β3∆Incomeit + β4TeamCap3t + β5TeamCap4t +ηt +αi + εit  23
more dimensions of a foreign player’s contributions to his team rather than just counting 
his place on the team roster.  Second, we pay close attention to whether the time series used 
in our panel regressions have unit roots.  Because our sample has a smaller number of 
cross-section units (n=12 NPB teams) and a larger number of time periods (t=45 seasons), 
panel regression estimates do not have the asymptotic properties that exist when the 
number of cross-section units is large. In the case of a relatively small panel in which there 
are more time-periods than cross-section units, it becomes important to ensure that the data 
panels used in the regression are stationary in order to obtain consistent unbiased estimates 
of coefficients.  
Table 6 reports the results of panel unit root tests for each variable panel.  We use the 
panel unit root test proposed by Breitung and Das (2005) because their test (1) is robust to 
relatively small samples, in our case just 45 time periods and 12 cross-section units      
yields consistent results when there are far more time-periods than cross-section units      
(3) is robust to cross-sectional correlation.  The Breitung-Das unit root test rejects a unit 
root in the levels of all but two of the variable panels:  Non-Jpn_ODPlaysit and Incomeit.  
Differencing Incomeit, we test again for a panel unit root and find that the null-hypothesis is 
rejected.  Consequently, we use ∆Incomeit in all panel regressions estimated below.  For 
Non-Jpn_ODPlaysit, a panel unit root is rejected at the five percent level of statistical 
significance but not at the ten percent level.  Differencing Non-Jpn_ODPlaysit, a panel unit 
root is rejected at the one percent level.
33  Since all relevant variables—the dependent 
variable, the independent variable that tests our hypothesis, and the control variables(s)—
                                                       
33 WinPercentit-1 is unlikely, a priori, to have a panel unit root, as its panel mean is, by definition, 50 
percent in each time period. Gamesbackit-1 could conceivably have a unit root if the league is 
becoming more (less) competitive over time, i.e., the annual standard deviation of WinPercentit is 
becoming smaller (larger) over time.   24
are stationary series, we can apply standard panel inference methods to interpret the 
regression’s estimated coefficients.  
Results from the difference specification of the fixed effect panel regressions are 
 (7)     
easier to interpret because the dependent variable, the two variables (WinPercentit-1 and 
WinPercentit-2) used to test our main hypothesis, and the control variable (∆INCOMEit) are 
all stationary.  Standard errors are clustered by team, as annual errors are likely to be 
correlated due to, among other things, multi-season contracts with team players and 
coaches. 
   We also estimate a dynamic panel specification that uses Non-Jpn_ODPlaysit as the 
dependent variable and includes a lagged dependent variable.  While GMM estimators are 
often the preferred choice for this type of specification, the small number of cross-section 
units (12 teams) and the longer number of time periods (45 seasons) indicates that the bias-
corrected least squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator is likely to perform better than 
GMM estimators with respect to bias and root mean squared error criteria (Bruno, 2005).  
We use a parametric bootstrap procedure to calculate standard errors.    
Table 7 reports results for fixed effects panel regressions on  Non-
Japanese_ODPlaysit using the equation 7 specification, and for dynamic panel regressions 
on Non-Japanese_ODPlaysit using the equation 6 specification                              
using the two alternate measures of team performance, WinPercentit and GamesBackit.
34   In 
all four specifications (Table 7, columns 1-4), estimated coefficients on ∆Incomeit are small 
                                                       
34 In Tables 7 and 8, we multiply all estimated regression coefficients and standard errors by 100 to 
facilitate reporting and discussion of results. 
∆Non − Jpn_ODPlaysit,it−1 = β1WinPercentit−1 + β2WinPercentit−2 + β3∆Incomeit
+β4TeamCap3t + β5TeamCap4t +ηt +αi + εit.  25
in magnitude and statistically insignificant at the ten percent level.  Estimated coefficients 
on the two variables controlling for NPB caps on the number of foreign players that can be 
registered by a team for each game (ForeignCap=3t and ForeignCap=4t) are positive, 
relatively large in magnitude, and statistically significant at the five percent level in all 
specifications.  The consistent pattern of results for these two variables provides strong 
evidence that the registration cap of two foreign players per team per game was a binding 
constraint for NPB teams during the 1966-1980 seasons. 
The main focus of our ODPlays regressions is to test the hypothesis that a team’s 
decision to use foreign players more frequently in its games is related to team performance 
over the previous two seasons.  An important finding is that the signs, magnitudes, and 
statistical significance of the estimated coefficients for both measures of team performance 
are broadly consistent.  In all four specifications, the estimated coefficient on the lagged 
team performance variable has a consistent sign (i.e., negative for WinPercentit-1 and 
positive for GamesBackit-1) and is statistically significant at the five percent level. 
Following this pattern, the estimated coefficient on the two-period lag of the team 
performance variable again has a consistent sign (i.e., positive for WinPercentit-2 and 
negative for GamesBackit-2) in all four specifications and is statistically significant at the 
ten percent level in three of the four specifications.   
These results are somewhat different from those in either Goff et al. (2002) or 
Hanssen and Meehan (2009), both of whom studied how an MLB team’s performance in 
the previous season affected the number of African-American players on a team’s roster in 
the current season.
35  Our results differ primarily because we find that the relationship 
                                                       
35 Our dependent variable, the share of foreign players in offensive and defensive plays, differs 
from the dependent variable used in other studies, counts of foreign players on rosters, and this may   26
between use of foreign players and team performance goes back at least two seasons rather 
than one, and that the estimated coefficient for the second season is the opposite of that for 
the first season, thereby diminishing the overall impact of team performance on foreign 
player share of offensive and defensive plays. The largest impact on the share of foreign 
players in team offensive and defensive plays occurs for teams that were successful 
(unsuccessful) two seasons earlier, but saw their performance fall off (improve) in the 
previous season.  Thus, good teams gone bad were the most likely to utilize more foreign 
players while bad teams gone good were the most likely to shed them.  
Do we obtain similar results when we estimate ODPlays regressions for Caucasian, 
African-American, and Latino players?  Since ODPlays is stationary in levels for 
Caucasian, African-American, and Latino players, we estimate the same dynamic panel 
specifications in the levels of ODPlay for each racial and ethnic group as we did earlier for 
NonJpn-ODPlays (equation 3, as reported in Table 7, columns 1 and 3).  Table 8 reports 
results for six specifications using the same two alternate measures of team performance 
for each of the three ethnic groups.  The estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable is less than 100 in all specifications and is statistically significant at the five 
percent level. Estimated coefficients for the team performance measures are similar to 
those reported in Table 7 for all non-Japanese players. In all four specifications, the 
estimated coefficient on the lagged team performance variable has a consistent sign (again, 
negative for WinPercentit and positive for GamesBackit-1) but only one coefficient 
(WinPercentit-1 in the Caucasian regression) is statistically significant at the five or ten 
percent level.  Signs for the estimated coefficient on the two-period lag of the team 
performance variable again follow those in Table 7 for the Latino and Caucasian 
                                                                                                                                                                 
account for some of the differences in results.   27
regressions, but are reversed for the African-American regressions.  Only one coefficient, 
GamesBackit-2 in the Caucasian regression, is statistically significant at the five or ten 
percent level.  While the overall pattern of the estimated coefficients in the ODPlays 
regressions for the three ethnic/racial groups resembles that observed in the Non-
Japanese_ODPlays regressions, coefficients are estimated with less precision.
36 We 
conclude that our econometric results for all foreign players do not readily extend to the 
smaller samples of Latinos, Caucasian, and African-American players.  Interpretation of 
these results is not obvious:  the statistically insignificant result could be due to the reduced 
precision of estimates using the smaller sample sizes of the respective player groups or, 
alternatively, could indicate that the relationship does not exist for the particular 
racial/ethnic group of players.    
 
VIII. Understanding Differences in Behavior Across MLB and JPL Teams  
NPB’s integration with foreign players and MLB’s integration with racial and ethnic 
minorities both took place during the two decades after World War II, and we found many 
similarities between the two processes.  First, initial integration of teams took a 
surprisingly long time to complete in both Japan and the United States, with the Boston 
Red Sox only adding an African-American player in 1959 and the Tokyo Giants only 
adding a Latino player in 1986.  Second, during the initial decades of integration, NPB 
foreign players had higher slugging averages than NPB Japanese players, and MLB 
minority players had higher slugging averages than Caucasian players.  Third, MLB 
                                                       
36 We note that the sign of the estimated coefficient on ForeignCap=3t is negative in the African-
American regressions and positive in the Caucasian regressions, thereby indicating some tendency 
for teams to replace African-American players with Caucasian players as the team cap on foreign 
players registered per game increased from two to three. 
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National League teams that added minority players and NPB Central League teams that 
added foreign players were more likely to win pennants than other teams. 
There were also notable differences in how MLB and NPB team characteristics 
affected their play of foreign players in games after the initial period of integration.  Goff et 
al. (2004) found that better-performing MLB teams were more likely to add minority 
players to                                                                              
                                                         that winning teams within 
striking distance of a pennant were more likely to add minority players.  For NPB teams, 
we identified a more nuanced relationship between team performance and the team’s play 
of foreign players:  Good teams gone bad were more likely to play foreign players, while 
Bad teams gone good were less likely. 
One factor that might explain this pattern in Japan’s professional baseball leagues is 
that teams are typically owned by large profit-maximizing Japanese corporations.  
Corporate owners of a team with a history of good performance that experiences a bad 
season may be worried that more embarrassing performances would tarnish their 
corporation’s image.  A quick, but expensive, solution (due to the higher salaries paid to 
foreign players) is for the team to enter the market for foreign players who, unless they are 
already under contract to another NPB team, are not “reserved” for particular teams.
37 
Vice-versa, an NPB team with a history of less than stellar performance that experiences a 
rare good season may drop expensive foreign players when the team’s performance surge 
comes primarily from the less expensive Japanese players on its roster.  Other factors may 
also be operating, such as the relatively short median tenure of foreign players (varying 
                                                       
37 In a rare expansion of MLB’s reserve clause beyond U.S. and Canadian borders, the Minnesota 
Twins sold their player contract with Greg “Boomer” Wells to the Hankyu Braves in 1983 (Fitts 
2005, 152-153).  See Sanderson and Siegfried (2006) for a retrospective on MLB’s reserve clause.   29
between one and two seasons) or the less specialized management of NPB teams relative to 
MLB teams. Sorting out these explanations as well as investigating the influence of MLB’s 
use of Japanese players on the NPB’s use of foreign and Japanese players is beyond the 
scope of this paper and forms the basis for future research on NPB player markets. 
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Appendix 
1. Names of Foreign Players on NPB Team Rosters during the 1958-2004 Seasons. 
 
“Chimu-betsu Gaikokujin-senshu Nenpyo (A chronological table of foreign players 
by team)”, Besu-boru Magajin (Baseball Magazine), Vol. 20, No. 4, Autumn 1996, 
pp. 94-97. 
 
“Chimu-betsu Zaiseki-Gaikokujin Nenpyo (A chronological table of foreign players 
by team)”, Besu-boru Magajin (Baseball Magazine), Vol. 24, No. 4, Autumn 2000, 
pp.130-136. 
 
Puro-yakyu Rekidai Gaikokujin-senshu (Past foreign players in professional 
baseball) 
http://kiwi.s3.xrea.com/dat/sukett.htm (last access on 30 September 2011). 
 
2. Pictures and country of birth of foreign players. 
 
“Gaikokujin Touroku-senshu Shashin Meikan (Name/picture directory of foreign 
players)” Besu-boru Magajin (Baseball Magazine), Vol. 24, No. 4, Autumn 2000, pp. 
88-129. 
 
Besu-boru Magajin-sha, Kettei-ban Nippon Puro-yakyu Gaikokujin-senshu Taikan 
(Encyclopedia of Foreign Players in Japan’s Professional Baseball), Tokyo: Besu-
boru Magajin-sha, 2002. 
 
Nippon Yakyu Kikou (Nippon Professional Baseball), Nippon Puro-yakyu Kiroku 
Dai-hyakka (Official Baseball Encyclopedia 2004), Tokyo: Besu-boru Magajin-sha, 
2004. 
 
Wayne S. Graczyk, Japan Pro Baseball 2002: Fan Handbook & Media Guide. 
Tokyo: Soho Printing, 2002. 
 
3. Offensive and defensive plays                                       and player 
performance data.  
 
Nippon Yakyu Kikou (Nippon Professional Baseball), Nippon Puro-yakyu Kiroku 
Dai-hyakka (Official Baseball Encyclopedia 2004), Tokyo: Besu-boru Magajin-sha, 
2004. 
 
“Kojin Nendo-betsu Seiseki (Season records for individual players)”, Besu-boru 
Magajin (Baseball Magazine), Vol. 24, No. 4, Autumn 2000, pp. 138-149. 
 
“Penanto-resu Soukatsu (Records of professional baseball 2004)” Shu-kan Besu-boru 
(Weekly Baseball), Vol. 59, No. 56, December 20, 2004, pp. 60-88. 
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Figure 2:  Slugging Average of Japanese and Foreign Players in NPB, 1958-2004 
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Figure 3. Foreign Players per NPB Team: 1958-2004 
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Table 1. NPB Summary Statistics for Panel Data Samples Used in Econometric Analysis 
 
Panels 1-2:  1951-1962 for 12 teams 
 
Variable      mean   s.d.    min    max 
Pacific League 
Pennantit      0.17    0.38    0.00    1.00 
WinPercentit-1    0.51    0.11    0.23    0.75 
Foreign Playersit   1.42    1.37    0.00    5.00 
 
Central League 
Pennantit      0.17    0.38    0.00    1.00 
WinPercentit-1    0.50    0.11    0.24    0.73 
Foreign Playersit   0.99    1.35    0.00    6.00 
 
 
Panels 3-5:  1951-1965 for 12 teams 
 
Variable      mean   s.d.    min    max 
African-American First Players, 1951-1980 
FirstAfricanAmeri  0.11    0.31    0.00    1.00 
WinPercentit-1    0.51    0.09    0.26    0.68 
 
Latino First Players, 1951-1999 
FirstLatinoi     0.06    0.24    0.00    1.00 
WinPercentit-1    0.50    0.08    0.26    0.68 
 
Caucasian First Players, 1951-1975 
FirstCaucasiani    0.19    0.40    0.00    1.00 
WinPercentit-1    0.49    0.09    0.26    0.68 
 
 
Panel 6:  1960-2004 for 12 teams 
 
Variable      mean   s.d.    min    max 
 
Foreign Players’ Share of Team Offensive and Defensive Plays (ODPlays)  
 
Foreign-ODPlaysit  0.10    0.06    0.00    0.26 
NonJpn-ODPlaysit  0.10    0.06    0.00    0.26 
Cauc-ODPlaysit    0.05    0.05    0.00    0.23 
AfrAmer-ODPlaysit  0.03    0.03    0.00    0.13 
Latino-ODPlaysit   0.01    0.02    0.00    0.15 
 
Other Variables 
WinPercentit-1     0.50   0.08    0.23    0.68 
GamesBack it-1    13.34   10.92   0.00    51.50 
PrefIncomeit    2665      910    675    4594 
ForeignCap=3t    0.22    0.42    0.00    1.00 
ForeignCap=4t    0.16    0.36    0.00    1.00   38
 
Table 2: Year in Which First Foreign Player on NPB Team Roster, By Ethnicity and Race 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Team             Caucasian  African-    Latino   Japanese- 




Giants          1975   1980     1986   1950 
Tigers          1960   1968     1965   1952 
Dragons          1963   1962     1999   1961 
Swallows (formerly Atoms)    1973   1966     1966   1963 
Carp            1975   1973     1972   1953 




Lions           1952   1969     1971   1952 
Buffaloes          1953   1966     1965   1952 
Fighters (formerly Flyers)    1958   1970     1995   1957 
Hawks          1959   1970     1996   1956 
Blue-Waves (formerly Braves)  1962   1952     1955   1950 
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Table 3. Panel Regressions on NPB Team Performance by League, 1951-1962 
 
A. Pacific League 
Dependent                   (1)         (2)           (3)     
Variable      WinPercentit  WinPercentit  Pennantit     
         
Estimate      pooled    random    pooled     
        OLS      effects    logit       
 
WinPercentit-1      0.16       0.66*      17.92** 
        (0.12)    (0.09)     (4.64) 
 
PropForeignit      0.03      -0.01      -9.27** 
         (0.05)     (0.06)     (1.41) 
 
Constant       0.49**    -0.18**    -10.79** 
        (0.07)    (0.05)      (2.80) 
 
Observations      72      72      72       
Team dummies      yes       no      no 
F-Statistic        16.27     -      - 
Prob > F         0.00     -      - 
Wald  
2(2)          -      60.78     - 
Prob >  
2(2)         -         0.00     - 
Log Likelihood         -        -      -19.61 
R
2           0.62      0.47        0.40   
 
B. Central League 
Dependent                   (1)         (2)           (3)     
Variable      WinPercentit  WinPercentit  Pennantit     
         
Estimator      pooled    random    pooled     
        OLS      effects    logit       
 
WinPercentit-1     0.29**     0.64**      4.72 
        (0.09)    (0.07)    (4.41) 
 
PropForeignit     0.12**     0.09*     5.99** 
        (0.05)    (0.04)    (2.04) 
 
Constant       0.38**     0.16**    -5.64** 
        (0.06)    (0.03)    (2.28) 
 
Observations     72      72      72       
Team dummies     yes       -      no 
F-Statistic       29.40     -      - 
Prob > F         0.00     -      - 
Wald  
2(2)          -      582.79    - 
Prob >  
2(2)         -          0.00    - 
Log Likelihood         -      -      -20.35   
R
2           0.71       0.63       0.62       40
Table 4. Regulations on Number of Foreign Players on NPB Team Roster 
 
      Full Team Roster
a  Registration for a Game 
 
1952-1954      No Restriction      3 
1955-1965      3        3 
1966-1980      2        2 
1981-1993      3        2 
1994-1995      3        3
b 
1996-1997      No Restriction      3
b 
1998-2001      No Restriction      4
c 
2002- 2011     No Restriction      4
d 
Notes:  
a The team roster includes both major and minor league players. 
b Three-player limit is restricted to a combination of fielders and pitchers, i.e., team is not 
allowed to register three fielders or three pitchers for a game. 
c Four-player limit is restricted to two fielders and two pitchers. 
d Four-player limit is restricted to a combination of fielders and pitchers, i.e., team is not 
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Table 5. Discrete-Time Hazard Regressions: First Ethnic Players on NPB Teams 
 
Dependent      First_Caucasian  First_African-    First_Latino 
Variable      Player    American Player    Player 
 
Leaguei       1.05       0.90         0.46 
        (1.54)    (0.89)      (0.74) 
 
WinPercentit-1    -17.53**    -11.83**       -5.69 
         (6.09)     (5.04)       (3.59) 
 
Estimator       Logit     Logit       Logit 
Year dummies     Yes       Yes         Yes     
Observations      68       49         67 
Wald χ
2        21.69     14.08       21.97 
Prob > χ
2          0.22       0.12         0.04 
Log likelihood    -15.26    -17.94      -29.01     
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Table 6. Breitung-Das Panel Unit Root Tests for 1958-2004 Panel 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable            Level           First-Difference 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
           λ      p-value    λ    p-value 
 
Incomeit       1.38     0.92      -5.55    0.00 
 
NonJpn-ODPlaysit  -1.59     0.06      -12.43  0.00 
 
Cauc-ODPlaysit    -4.32     0.00      -13.75  0.00 
 
AfrAm-ODPlaysit   -6.00     0.00      -24.33   0.00 
   
Latino-ODPlaysit   -6.05     0.00      -17.73  0.00 
 
WinPercentit-1    -5.28     0.00 
 
GamesBackit-1    -5.38     0.00 
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Table 7. Panel Regressions:  Share of Non-Japanese Foreign Players in Offensive and 
Defensive Plays on NPB Teams, 1960-2004  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Dependent      ∆NonJpn-    NonJpn-    ∆NonJpn-    NonJpn- 
Variable      ODPlaysit    ODPlaysit     ODPlaysit    ODPlaysit 
 
        (1)        (2)               (3)                  (4) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
NonJpn-             -18.29**          -18.17** 
ODPlays,t-1            (4.57)           (4.56) 
 
WinPercentit-1    -6.74**     -5.93**         
         (1.59)     (2.41)   
 
WinPercentit-2     3.83**      2.70 
              (1.67)              (2.70)   
 
GamesBackit-1                    0.04**     0.034** 
                     (0.01)     (0.017) 
   
GamesBackit-2                -0.03**          -0.02  
                    (0.01)    (0.02) 
 
ΔIncomeit      -0.001    -0.00     -0.001    -0.001 
        (0.001)    (0.00)    (0.001)    (0.001)   
 
ForeignCap=3t      0.96**
      1.19**     0.97**      1.21** 
         (0.28)    (0.42)    (0.28)        (0.42) 
 
ForeignCap=4t      0.91**     0.99*    0.89**     0.97* 
        (0.23)    (0.52)    (0.23)        (0.53) 
 
Constant       1.51            0.10          
        (1.03)          (0.23)          
Estimator      f.e.      lsdvc     f.e      lsdvc 
Cluster s.e. (team)  Yes      No      Yes          No 
Observations    540      540      540          540 
F-statistic      14.02     na      14.68          na 
(p-value)      0.0002    na      0.0002               na 
R
2        0.04      na      0.03           na 
f.e. = fixed effects estimator.  lsdv = bias corrected least squares dummy variable estimator.  
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Table 8. Bias Corrected Least Squares Dummy Variable Regressions:  Share of Caucasian, 
Latino, and African-American Players in Team Offensive and Defensive Plays,1960-2004.  
 
Dependent Variable:  Caucasian  Caucasian  African-  African-  Latino  Latino 
Share of Ethnic            American  American 
Players in ODPlaysit                 
 
One Season Lag,   64.00**  64.00**   63.79**  64.10**  54.61**     54.45** 
Dependent Variable  (4.21)  (4.21)  (4.65)  (4.63)  (4.64)         (4.67) 
 
WinPercentit-1    -5.18       -1.99       -1.17 
        (2.33)      (1.68)      (1.17) 
 
WinPercentit-2     6.06       -1.07        0.84 
        (4.71)      (1.88)      (1.31) 
 
GamesBackit-1         0.026
       0.01
          0.01 
            (0.016)      (0.01)      (0.01) 
 
GamesBackit-2        -0.033*       0.01
                    0.00 
            (0.017)      (0.01)      (0.01) 
 
∆Incomeit       -0.002  -0.000   0.000   0.000
             - 0.001
            -0.001 
        (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)      (0.001) 
 
ForeignCap=3t     2.96**   1.70**  -0.66**  -0.63**   0.27    0.28 
        (0.72)  (0.40)  (0.31)  (0.31)  (0.21)  (0.21) 
 
ForeignCap=4t      3.64**   2.09**  -0.05   -0.07    1.37**   1.37** 
        (0.98)  (0.56)  (0.38)  (0.39)  (0.28)  (0.29) 
 
 
Estimator      lsdv    lsdv     lsdv    lsdv     lsdv    lsdv 
Observations    540    540    540    540    540    540 
     
 